Empirical evidence on characteristics of the wage structure is presented in Frijns and Van Schaaijk (1987 and 1983 of workers at the lower end of the pay structure cannot be associated with a substantial rise of the relative wage level of this category.
However, there appears to be a relationship between the change in the unemployment rate and the relative wage level. A comparison of developments in the US and the Netherlands shows a strong growth of unemployment (especially at the lower wage brackets) in the country with the narrow wage distribution, in casu the Netherlands. The twin observation is that the "employment miracle" in the US may have a shadow side in the form of a more unequal pay distribution.
The dual labour market theory which has its origin in sociology (e.g. Ashton, Chapter 3, 1986 ) may shed some light on these issues. The idea of a dual labour market has more recently gained solid ground in economics by the introduction of a two-sector model with a union sector and a non-union sector. A brief survey of this approach is presented in Greenhalgh, et.al. (1983) , Oswald (1985) and Sinclair (1987) . As observed by Akerlof and Yellen (1986) dual labor markets can also be explained by the assumption that the wage-efficiency nexus is important in some sectors 3 but not in others. Here we shall follow this suggestion by constructing a
Harris-Todaro two-sector model (see Harris and Todaro, 1970) . Efficiency wages are paid in the primary sector of the economy and neo-classical market-clearing of the labour market prevails in the secondary sector. In earlier fornulations of the dual labour market theory the primary sector is supposed to have some control over the product market. As argued by Ashton (1986) The efficiency function has the usual characteristics, which guarantee an interior solution in case of profit maximization (cf. Akerlof, 1982) : (1) no positive effort is obtained at a zero wage; (2) the elasticity of e with respect to wl~w is declining for an increasing wage ratio. 2 With the price of output (pl) and the nominal wage rate in sector 2(w2) given the representative firm in sector 1 faces the following problem: The first-order conditions for this problem are
Combination of equations (3) and (4) yields the familiar "Solow condition"
, w (2.4a) e 1 -1 e w2
For an optimum the elasticity of the efficiency function should be equal to unity (Solow, 1979 In the secondary sector efficiency wages play no role; the wageproductivity relationship is weak or non-existant. Consequently, the demand for labour in sector 2 depends upon the wage, which is determined in the spot market for secondary jobs. The production function for sector 2 is (2.5) x2 -f2(~2;k2)~f2~0 , f2~0
Maximization of profits in the short run requires that marginal revenu equals marginal labour cost. With p2 and w2 given this condition can be written as (2.6) p2f2 -w2
The aggregate supply of labour (.Cs) is exogeneously determined. Worker who cannot find a job in the primary sector apply for work in the secondary sector. The wage rate in sector 2 can be found by equating labour supply and labour demand in this sector:
For a given value p2 equations (2.~) and (2.8) simultaneously determine the wage rate and employment in the secondary sector.
The mobility of labour between sectors may not be so perfect as assumed here. After all, there may be a substantial wage differential and there is rationing of jobs in the primary sector. Therefore, as observed among others by Hall (19~5) , Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and in another context also by McDonald and Solow (1985) , workers who do not get a job in sector 1 could prefer searching above accepting work in the secondary sector.
The search process can be modelled if a number of additional assumptions is made. But the question remains whether search is compatible with an equilibrium. To illustrate this point consider the following case which greatly simplifies the search model in McDonald and Solow (1985) .
There is a fixed percentage of jobs (ó~l) Substituting the formula for the probability of finding a primary job gives after some manipulation:
The volume of the pool is positively related to the number of primary jobs, the turnover rate of these jobs, the wage differential and unemploy- The curve AA' measures the demand for labour in sector 1 given the equili-. . If the government sets a minimum wage above the level that results from the free play of market forces as may be typical for a number of
European countries there will be unemployment. The same result applies in case unemployment benefits lead to a reservation wage of workers which is higher than the equilibrium wage rate in the secondary sector. The solution in these cases is presented in Figure 2 . The minimum wage level is indicated by w2. Given this wage rate in the secondary sector firms in the primary sector choose an optimal wl and .il at point S. Labour supply in sector 2 is elastic at the point w-w. Employment in the secondary 2 -2 sector is determined at the intersection of the elastic supply curve and the labour demand curve of that sector (point S'). The resulting unemployment is marked by u in Figure 2 . If the discrepancy between primary and secondary sectors ís substantial there may be a large number of low-paid workers in the equilibrium. That is the price that has to be paid for maintaining full-employment with a relative large secondary sector. Such a solution seems more typical for the US than for Europe where relative poverty may be transformed into unemployment by a generous social security system and minimum wage legislation. As shown for instance in Van de Klundert (1983) The elasticity of marginal effort (y) must be smaller than one, because the elasticity of the effort function must be declining (e.g. Akerlof, 1982) . In the case of the specification of this function given above we gety-1 -y.
The linear version of the production function and the demand for labour in sector 2 are obtained easily. From equation (2.5) we have:
, where g2 denotes the share of labour in value-added of sector 2. Equation (2.6) yields the linear labour demand relation in the secondary sector: 62 . . . (3.6)~2 --1-p2 (w2-p2) } k2
, where o2 denotes the elasticity of factor substitution in sector 2.
Labour-market equilibrium ímplies according to equation (2.~):
(3.7) 8.~1 t (1-9)~2 -~s , where 8 is the share of labour in the primary sector at the point of linearization.
On the demand side of the model account will be taken of a shift in demand from goods produced in sector 2 towards goods produced in sector an inflow of relatively less educated workers will make it more difficult for firms in sector 1 to maintain their share in total employment. Therefore, it must be concluded that the effort function will deteriorate (a ) 0), leading to a shift in employment from the primary to the secondary sector. As a result the bulk of the increase in labour supply must be absorbed in the secondary sector. 
1-a a
The following simplifying assumptions which relate to the solution of the model at the point of linearization are made:~-S -~, 8-~. 1 2
In addition we postulate kl -k2 -k. Although these assumptions may seem rather restrictive, they enable to focus on the main determinants of sectoral real wages in terms of the composite consumption good. The real consumers' wage for both groups of workers can then be deduced from equations (4.6) -(4.10). These results can easily be explained.
In the primary sector the loss in efficiency is to a certain extent counterbalanced by the fall in real producers' wages. The outcome may go either way. Moreover, the decline in efficiency leads to a rise in pl and therefore to a reduction in purchasing power for which workers in 20 sector 2 get compensation. Real consumers' wages in sector 2 remain constant, but real producers' wages increase as can be seen from equation (4.~). It may be concluded that a more narrow distribution of wages is accompanied by a higher level of unemployment of relatively low-productivity workers.
Conclusions
The growing concern about poverty in the midst of plenty in industrialized countries may be an indication of a more pronounced duality in the economy with important consequences for the labour market. If primary sector jobs get lost because a more sophisticated production process requires relatively more workers with high ability the secondary sector must absorb more labour. This will lead to a more unequal real wage distribution between workers in both sectors. A growth in the labour force will have a similar effect if it upsets the productivity distribution as may be the case with immigration from developing countries.
Whereas such developments may prevail in the US, the situation in Europe is different. Minimum wage legislation and generous unemployment compensation in a number of European countries may set a floor to the wage rate in the secondary sector. An intensification of duality will then show up in increased unemployment of low-productivity groups. The problem is most severe with real wage rigidity in the secondary sector. In the latter case monetary policy is of no help and unemployment must be fought by supply-side measures.
Future research on the dual labour market may focus on the specification of the efficiency-wage relationship in different sectors of the economy. In addition, a distinction could be made between groups of workers with different skills, which are imperfect substitutes in the production process. As in the present paper general equilibrium theory can be applied to integrate these different strands of analysis.
